

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ARA-06 NEA-06 IO-10 ISO-00 EURE-00 SSO-00

NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-01

INR-05 L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-02

SS-15 CU-02 BIB-01 ACDA-05 SAJ-01 SAM-01 EB-07 TRSE-00

OMB-01 EA-06 AEC-05 AECE-00 OES-03 COME-00 CIEP-01

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5062

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AMEMBASSY BONN

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AMEMBASSY OSLO

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 29772

BRUSSELS FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, FR, UR
SUBJECT: BREZHNEV VISIT: QUAI AND SOVIET EMBASSY VIEWS

REF: PARIS 29492

SUMMARY. IH SEPARATE EMBASSY CONVERSATIONS WITH SOVIET MINISTER-COUNSELOR AND WITH QUAI ACTING DIRECTOR FOR EASTERN EUROPE, BOTH MEN DENIED THAT BREZHNEV BROUGHT GISCARD AROUND ON A CSCE SUMMIT, ALTHOUGH SOVIETS ADMIT THAT THERE WAS SOME FRENCH MOVEMENT ON CSCE AT RAMBOUILLET. ON MIDDLE EAST, BOTH FRENCH AND SOVIETS SHARE A COMMON JUDGMENT THAT THE SITUATION REMAINS EXTREMELY DANGEROUS, WITH US SEEMINGLY NOT INCLINED TO PUT PRESSURE ON ISRAEL. ALTHOUGH CALLING IN THE COMMUNIQUE FOR AN IMMEDIATE RESUMPTION OF THE GENEVA TALKS, NEITHER SIDE SEEMS OPTIMISTIC AT THE PROSPECTS. ON CYPRUS, BOTH SIDES FIRMLY DENY INTERPRETATION IN LEWIS ARTICLE THAT THE COMMUNIQUE REFERENCE WAS AIMED AT THE CONFIDENTIAL

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LIQUIDATION OF BRITISH BASES. THE FRENCH THOUGHT THAT BREZHNEV, ALTHOUGH CLEARLY TIRED, WAS MENTALLY ALERT AND ON TOP OF HIS SUBJECTS. PRIME MINISTER CHIRAC WILL PROBABLY VISIT THE SOVIET UNION NEXT SPRING. END SUMMARY.

1. NEITHER THE QUAI NOR THE SOVIET EMBASSY HAS YET SEEN AN ACCOUNT OF THE GISCARD-BREZHNEV TETE-A-TETES,

WHICH OCCUPIED AN UNUSUALLY LARGE PORTION OF THE DECEMBER 5-7 RAMBOUILLET TALKS. THE FOLLOWING VIEWS ARE THUS BASED ALMOST ENTIRELY ON THE MEETINGS WHICH INCLUDED GROMYKO AND SAUVAGNARGUES. THE TETE-A-TETES WERE ALL LATE IN STARTING AND LASTED FROM 1 1/2 TO 2 HOURS EACH. DRAFTING THE COMMUNIQUE WAS A MAJOR STRUGGLE, RUNNING ON LATE INTO THE NIGHT WITH EACH SIDE ACCUSING THE OTHER OF BEING DIFFICULT.

2. CSCE: SOVIET VIEW. IN A CONVERSATION WITH DCM DECEMBER 10, SOVIET MINISTER-COUNSELOR KIZICHENKO SAID THAT THERE WAS SOME MOVEMENT BY THE FRENCH ON CSCE AT RAMBOUILLET. IN WORKING OUT THE COMMUNIQUE, THE FRENCH EMPHASIZED THAT A LOT REMAINED TO BE DONE AT GENEVA, WHILE THE SOVIETS STRESSED THAT MUCH HAD ALREADY BEEN DONE. KIZICHENKO NOTED THAT IN RECENT DAYS AT GENEVA, GREAT PROGRESS WAS MADE WITH CONCESSIONS BY BOTH EAST AND WEST. HE CONFIRMED THAT THE FINAL SENTENCE OF THE COMMUNIQUE'S CSCE PORTION WAS DRAFTED PERSONALLY BY GISCARD AND BREZHNEV. ASKED ABOUT THE FRENCH BASKET THREE PROPOSAL FOR CULTURAL CENTERS AND READING ROOMS, HE SAID THERE HAD BEEN NO MOVEMENT; THE SOVIETS REMAIN FIRMLY OPPOSED. BOTH SIDES BROUGHT THEIR CSCE DELEGATION HEADS TO RAMBOUILLET. SECOND SECRETARY TSAPALKINE, IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION WITH AN EMBOFF DEC 10, EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT BREZHNEV AND PRESIDENT FORD MADE PROGRESS ON CSCE AT VLADIVOSTOK, AND THAT FRANCE HAD TO SHIFT ITS POSITION TO KEEP UP WITH THE US.

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3. CSCE: QUAI VIEW. IN A CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF DECEMBER 11, QUAI ACTING DIRECTOR FOR EAST EUROPE OMNES SAID THAT THE IMPRESSION THAT BREZHNEV SUCCEEDED IN CHANGING GISCARD'S ATTITUDE TOWARD A CSCE SUMMIT IS NOT ACCURATE. TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS MADE AT GENEVA IN RECENT WEEKS -- AS NOTED IN THE COMMUNIQUE -- THE FRENCH AGREED TO SOVIET DEMANDS THAT THE COMMUNIQUE CONTAIN, AS DID THE VLADIVOSTOK COMMUNIQUE, A REFERENCE TO THE EVENTUALITY OF CONCLUDING CSCE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL. THE FRENCH HAVE NEVER BEEN AGAINST THIS. OMNES WENT ON TO LAY PARTICULAR STRESS ON THE PENULTIMATE SENTENCE OF THE COMMUNIQUE'S CSCE PORTION. HE SAID THE FRENCH GOT THE SOVIETS TO AGREE TO A JOINT STATEMENT PLEDGING TO INTENSIFY THEIR EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE OUTSTANDING CSCE QUESTIONS -- SOMETHING THE US DID NOT GET OUT OF THE SOVIETS IN VLADIVOSTOK. ON THE FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR CULTURAL CENTERS AND READING ROOMS, OMNES SAID THAT AS FAR AS HE KNEW, THE FRENCH DID NOT RAISE THIS ISSUE.

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4. MIDDLE EAST. OMNES SAID THERE HAD BEEN GENERAL AGREEMENT AT RAMBOUILLET THAT THE US -- THE ONLY POWER ABLE TO PUT PRESSURE ON ISRAEL -- DID NOT SEEM INCLINED TO DO MUCH. CONSEQUENTLY THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION REMAINED EXTREMELY DANGEROUS, WITH OMINOUS PARALLELS WITH THE SITUATION IN THE MONTHS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR. THE FRENCH TEND TO AGREE WITH THE SOVIET ASSESSMENT OF ARAFAT AS A MODERATE AND A REALIST AMONG THE PALESTINIAN LEADERS.

5. TURNING TO THE COMMUNIQUE, OMNES DREW ATTENTION TO THE REFERENCES FAVORABLE TO ISRAEL WHICH HE SAID WERE INCLUDED AT FRENCH INSISTENCE, I.E., THE RIGHT OF ALL STATES IN THE REGION TO AN INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE WITHIN SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BORDERS. IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF THE COMMUNIQUE'S MIDDLE EAST PORTION, IN WHICH BOTH SIDES CALLED FOR THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE RESUMPTION OF THE GENEVA PEACE CONFERENCE, OMNES EMPHASIZED THAT THE PHRASE "AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND" ("DANS CETTE PERSPECTIVE") HAD BEEN ADDED AT FRENCH INSISTENCE TO STRESS THAT A GENEVA NEGOTIATION MUST BE BASED ON:

- 1) WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM ALL OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, AND
- 2) RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT OF EVERY STATE IN THE AREA TO EXIST WITHIN SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BORDERS.

6. REMARKING ON US RETICENCE TOWARD AN IMMEDIATE RESUMPTION OF THE GENEVA TALKS (EMBOFF INTERJECTED THAT WE FAVORED THE IDEA PROVIDED THAT THE ARABS AGREE ON THEIR REPRESENTATION AND THAT A WAY IS FOUND TO OVERCOME ISRAELI REFUSAL TO TALK TO THE PLO), OMNES SAID THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NOT BEEN OPTIMISTIC REGARDING THE LIKELIHOOD OF THE TALKS' EARLY RESUMPTION, AND IMPLIED THAT THE FRENCH WERE NOT OPTIMISTIC EITHER.

7. REGARDING THE COMMUNIQUE DEMAND FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM "ALL OCCUPIED TERRITORIES," OMNES SAID THAT THIS HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE FRENCH POSITION, AND IT REMAINS THEIR INTERPRETATION THAT THIS DOES NOT EXCLUDE MINOR BORDER ADJUSTMENTS. KIZICHENKO NOTED THAT THE DISPUTE ON THIS POINT GOES BACK TO THE NOVEMBER 1967 UN RESOLUTION. CONFIDENTIAL

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TION AND THE DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FRENCH AND ENGLISH VERSIONS. THE USSR HAS ALWAYS TAKEN THE MORE RESTRICTIVE VIEW. THAT POINT HAVING BEEN MADE, KIZICHENKO INDICATED THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT EXCLUDE THAT NEGOTIATIONS COULD RESULT IN BOTH SIDES AGREEING TO SOME MINOR ADJUSTMENTS.

8. CYPRUS. KIZICHENKO POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVIETS TOOK THE BASIC WORDING FOR THE COMMUNIQUE REFERENCE TO CYPRUS DIRECTLY FROM THE UN RESOLUTION. THE SOVIET-FRENCH FORMULATION WAS NOT EVEN AS STRONG AS THE UN VERSION, AND DEFINITELY WAS NOT INTENDED TO BREAK ANY NEW GROUND. OMNES NOTED THE "WILDLY INACCURATE" ARTICLE BY FLORA LEWIS IN THE DECEMBER 10 HERALD-TRIBUNE INTERPRETING THE CYPRUS PORTION OF THE COMMUNIQUE, WHICH CALLED FOR THE RAPID WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS, AS AIMED AT THE LIQUIDATION OF BRITISH BASES. HE STATED FLATLY THAT THERE WAS NOT THE SLIGHTEST BIT OF TRUTH IN THIS INTERPRETATION. HE ADDED THAT THE FRENCH HAD VETOED A SOVIET ATTEMPT TO INSERT INTO THE COMMUNIQUE'S CYPRUS PORTION A DEROGATORY REFERENCE TO "EXTERNAL

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INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE

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FORCES."

9. INDOCHINA. RE THE COMMUNIQUE PARAGRAPH ON INDOCHINA, OMNES SAID THAT THE FRENCH WANTED TO MENTION THE 1962 LAOS ACCORDS, BUT THE SOVIETS TURNED THIS DOWN COLD AND REFUSED TO BUDGE.

10. OTHER INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. OMNES DISMISSED THE DISARMAMENT PORTION OF THE COMMUNIQUE AS "BANAL." ON THE UN PORTION, HE SAID THAT IN VIEW OF PAST SOVIET EFFORTS TO REVISE THE UN CHARTER, THE FRENCH WERE PLEASED THAT THEY HAD PERSUADED THE SOVIETS IN THE COMMUNIQUE TO JOIN IN REAFFIRMING THEIR ATTACHMENT TO THE CHARTER.

11. BILATERAL ECONOMIC ISSUES. BOTH KIZICHENKO AND OMNES CONFIRMED THAT THE PRICE FOR THE SOVIET GAS SALE TO THE FRENCH IS NOT YET AGREED UPON. KIZICHENKO COMMENTED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD OFFERED TO SELL THEIR NATURAL GAS TO THE FRENCH BEFORE THEY BEGAN NEGOTIATING WITH ANY OF THE OTHER WEST EUROPEANS; THE FRENCH CONTINUE TO BE CONFIDENTIAL

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THE STICKIEST OF ALL ON TERMS. OMNES, WHO PLAYED DOWN THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BILATERAL ECONOMIC ACCORDS, CONFIRMED THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CREDIT PROTOCOL WERE HUNG UP FOR SOME TIME ON THE ISSUE OF INTEREST RATES. HE WAS RELUCTANT TO GIVE EMBOFF THE EXACT INTEREST FIGURE BUT GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SIDES HAD SETTLED BETWEEN 7 AND 7.5 PERCENT. HE SAID THAT IN ORDER TO PERSUADE THE SOVIETS TO AGREE TO A HIGHER INTEREST RATE, THE FRENCH HAD AGREED TO RAISE THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF CREDITS -- WHICH THE SOVIETS WILL USE TO PURCHASE

MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT.

12. SOVIET-PCF RELATIONS. KIZICHENKO SAID THAT THE SOVIETS AND THE PCF HAVE AGREED TO DISAGREE. PCF SECRETARY GENERAL MARCHAIS WILL CONTINUE TO ATTACK THE GOF AS DOING NO GOOD. MOSCOW THINKS THAT THE GOF IS DOING SOME GOOD; THIS IS A CLEAR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND THE PCF.

13. BREZHNEV'S HEALTH. OMNES SAID THAT BREZHNEV, ALTHOUGH CLEARLY TIRED AND NOT IN TOP FORM PHYSICALLY, WAS MENTALLY ALERT THROUGHOUT THE VISIT AND GAVE EVERY IMPRESSION OF HAVING MASTERED HIS DOSSIERS. BREZHNEV WAS OFF HIS FEED AT THE START, AND DURING THE FIRST DAY OF TALKS (DECEMBER 5) HE ATE AND DRANK VERY SPARINGLY; HE PERKED UP NOTICEABLY, HOWEVER, ON DECEMBER 6 AND 7. KIZICHENKO EXPLAINED THAT THE REASON FOR THE DECEMBER 6 LUNCH CANCELLATION WAS THAT THE MORNING TETE-A-TETE, WHICH WAS SUPPOSED TO END AT 1 P.M., STARTED LATE AND CONTINUED UNTIL AROUND 2:30 P.M., MAKING IT TOO LATE TO HAVE THE LUNCH; THIS HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH BREZHNEV'S HEALTH.

14. WILL BREZHNEV STEP DOWN? OMNES, INDICATING HE WAS SPEAKING PERSONALLY, MUSED THAT HE DID NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT BREZHNEV MIGHT BE THINKING OF STEPPING DOWN IN ANOTHER YEAR OR SO, PROVIDED THAT HE COULD CAP HIS CAREER WITH 1) A SALT II AGREEMENT, 2) A CSCE SUMMIT, AND 3) A SUCCESSFUL PARTY CONGRESS -- ALL IN 1975. HE THOUGHT THAT NEITHER KOSYGIN NOR PODGORNYY COULD POSSIBLY SUCCEED BREZHNEV AS THE SOVIETS' CONFIDENTIAL

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NUMBER ONE. INSTEAD, THE REINS OF POWER WOULD LIKELY PASS -- POSSIBLY AFTER A PERIOD OF INTERNAL PARTY STRUGGLE -- TO ONE OR MORE RELATIVE UNKNOWNNS FROM A YOUNGER GENERATION, NOW IN THEIR LATE 40'S OR 50'S.

15. GISCARD AND CHIRAC VISITS TO USSR. CONFIRMING THAT GISCARD'S OFFICIAL VISIT TO THE USSR IS BEING PLANNED FOR THE FALL OF 1975, OMNES SAID IT WAS VERY PROBABLE THAT PRIME MINISTER CHIRAC WILL VISIT THE SOVIET UNION BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT, MOST LIKELY NEXT SPRING.
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